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Dependencia Theory and Innovation in
Mexico: The Dissolution of Property in
Inventive Ideas
GEORGE M. ARMSTRONG, JR.*
This study of economic and legal development in Mexico examines
intellectual property and the right to exclude others from inventive ideas.
There are several reasons for examining the relation between the market
and law in this context. First, patent law is an important piece of Mex-
ico's policy on technology and this policy has been the subject of robust
debate in the press and in Congress since the early 1970s. Statesmen,
scientists and academicians have sharply disagreed on the causes of their
nation's underdevelopment and have advanced various prescriptions. The
government adopted one theory from among those presented in these de-
bates, the concept of third world development known as dependencia,
and fashioned legislation upon its premises. The opposing theory which
attributed Mexico's underdevelopment to indigenous cultural and politi-
cal factors, such as weak incentives to innovate and limitations on compe-
tition, have had little influence on policy.
Second, dependencia theory is a critique of market exchange from
the perspective of distributive justice, explaining shortcomings in the do-
mestic economy of a host country through the influence of market power.
Dependencia theory hypothesized that multinational corporations im-
peded innovation in Mexico by employing patents to monopolize technol-
* George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul M.
Hebert Law Center. After a protracted battle with a fatal disease, Professor Armstrong
passed away on September 8, 1990. Professor Armstrong was an intiator whose ideas ranged
from a new course in Transactions in Industrial Property to dramatic enhancements in the
Civil Law Program at Lousiana State University. Professor Armstrong was described by the
University of Lousiana as "a brilliant scholar, an excellent and dedicated teacher, and a
good friend to all who knew him." Professor Armstrong's outstanding contributions to legal
scholarship will definately be missed.
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ogy and through one-sided licensing agreements. In the 1970s, the govern-
ment of Mexico followed the prescription of this theory, revised the
patent laws and established administrative controls over the international
transfer of technology. However, these reforms were empty promises. The
anticipated flowering of innovation has not occurred.
The final reason for analyzing the relationship between law and the
means of distribution in the context of intellectual property is the most
significant. The failure of the dependencia theory to explain un-
derdevelopment and the inability of these new laws and institutions to
stimulate innovation tend to confirm that the obstacles to development
are domestic. The impediment to innovation is not distortion of the mar-
ket by the excessive power of some participants, it is the minimal impor-
tance of the market as a device for distributing property.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEXICAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM
In Mexico, compulsion in various forms overshadows the market as
the mechanism which allocates the factors of production. Factors of pro-
duction and objects of enjoyment are values. Some values are objects of
commerce. Others, such as virginity are not. Values which are in com-
merce are commodities. One of the characteristics of commodities is the
capacity of a person who has rights in them to protect them from tres-
pass. Market society creates property, rights of exclusive use, by separat-
ing attributes of the individual from the individual or by privatizing at-
tributes of the community, by reifying those attributes and transforming
them into "things." The legal system of a market society gradually stan-
dardizes the procedures for recognizing, defending and alienating those
rights. The process of commodification has created property from individ-
uals' names and likeness, authorship, invention, labor and land. At one
time or another, the dominant philosophy of the day has maintained that
each of these articles was an inalienable attribute of the individual or
community. Today, they are commodities. The right to alienate them and
exclude others from them are protected by law.
In Mexico, this process has been retarded and commodification has
not functioned in the same fashion as in societies in which the market is
more significant. The communitarian land-owning practices of sixteenth
century Spain complemented the traditions of the Indians. When land
did become subject to private ownership, it was rarely an object of com-
merce for it ordinarily belonged to the church or an entailed hacienda.
Compulsion was more important than contract as a device for organizing
labor until the twentieth century. A succession of unfree devices such as
encomienda (entrusting of Indians to colonists), ganane (obligations
based on birth place) and debt peonage tied campesinos to haciendas.
Production for family subsistence exceeded purchase of food stuffs. Par-
ticipation in market exchange has developed more slowly for Mexicans
than for persons in some other societies. Consequently, they are less ac-
customed to thinking of themselves as traders and the factors of produc-
tion than as commodities.
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Mexico has also imported many norms of property and contract law
which its society did not demand and its social conditions could not
maintain. Disamortization of village lands in the 1850s contradicted the
communal tendencies of the Indians. The civil code of 1870, imported
from France, presupposed the existence of a society of traders, and the
abolition of forced heirship a decade later granted Mexicans a degree of
autonomy in disposing of their property which they had not sought. In
this century, the government's plan to organize agriculture along collec-
tive lines was borrowed from Soviet socialism. In the 1940s, Mexico
adopted a system of patent law which presupposed the presence of an
inventive culture and of industry avidly engaged in innovation, in short, a
supply of and demand for invention; neither of which existed. These im-
ported rules for recognizing and defending the right to exclude others
from inventive ideas did not encourage science by protecting its fruits.
Yet those who anathemized the patent system were also in error, for the
removal of the fences which protected the pastures of high technology in
the 1970s did not cause a stampede of trespassers bound to take advan-
tage of others' creative efforts. Mexico's patent laws are probably irrele-
vant, at least to domestic inventors. They do not encourage or protect
invention because the dearth of competition stifles the incentive to inno-
vate. There is no need to protect technology from trespass in a society
which lacks the infrastructure to use it.
Social scientists in Mexico and other developing countries criticized
patent laws and blamed the market power of patent owners for a variety
of the ailments of the developing world. One author's list of five dysfunc-
tional consequences of patent legislation was typical of the genre.1 Firms
from highly industrialized countries employ patents, he said, to perpetu-
ate monopoly conditions, to avoid the development of substitute technical
processes, to discourage new foreign investment in developing countries
by protecting monopolistic markets, to acquire control of weak firms in
those same nations by restricting the supply of technology, and to en-
courage the transfer of obsolete or inappropriate technology to the third
world. In support of these conclusions, analysts produced statistics which
showed that ninety-two percent (92%) of all patents registered in Mexico
belonged to foreigners.2 In the developing world as a whole, the figure was
said to be five-sixths. The percentage of patented inventions which were
never put into production may have been as large as ninety-five percent
(95%).s
The intention of the foreign inventors who acquired these patents
was probably to block competition with other firms from the advanced
countries, not to control the domestic economies of developing nations.
1. Arango, Tecnologia y Dependencia, 40 EL TRIMESTRE ECONOMICO 384 (1973).
2. Gribmont & Rimez, La Politica Economica Del Gobierno de Luis Echeverria, 44 EL
TRIMESTRE ECONOMIco 825 (1977).
3. J. SOBERANIS, LA REGULACION DE LAS INVENCIONES Y MARCAS Y DE LA TRANSFERENCIA
TECNOLOGICA 50 (1979).
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Because the monopoly which a patent confers is only nationwide, an in-
ventor who wishes to block competitors from adopting an invention must
obtain patents in numerous countries. Nonetheless, many nationalists
concluded that "the system of industrial property appears clearly as an
indispensable mechanism for reproduction and extension of technological
dependency."' Foreign patent owners would only license their technology
to Mexican companies, according to this line of argument, in return for
"super prices" and in concert with "restrictive commercial practices
which are included in the licensing contracts."5
Mexico's technological dependency did not become a subject of de-
bate until the 1960s. In 1958 a governmental commission presented a
draft law on foreign investments.' The bill, which was never adopted,
would have required government approval of all direct, foreign invest-
ment. There were no provisions in the bill for regulation of technology of
foreign origin. The absence of regulation of foreign investment and tech-
nology licenses prior to this date was not accidental. Official spokesmen
had often rejected suggestions 'to regulate these areas, alluding to the
complexity of the international economy and the importance of flexibility
in international negotiations.7
In the years between the Second World War and the Echeverria
presidency, Mexico's policy was to welcome foreign investment and sub-
stitute manufactured goods of domestic origin for imports.' The govern-
ment protected these foreign investors, as it shielded its native capitalists,
with protective tariffs, setting import duties at the rate which industry
suggested. According to one observer, "The basic principle of orientation
is to fix a tariff which guarantees the market for the national product."'
Tax exemptions and direct subsidies sweetened the rewards for investors.
The government did not discriminate against businesses owned by
foreigners.
Foreign technology and capital, protected by high tariffs, brought an
economic boom to Mexico in those years; but even before the election of
Echeverria in 1970 and the ascendancy of third world nationalism in the
wake of the Arab oil embargo in 1973, various interests were encouraging
the government to restrict foreign investment in the national interest.
One author wrote that the need for legal regulation of foreign capital was
"unpostponable." 10 Michael Wionczek, Mexico's foremost authority on
technology policy, has written that scientists began to express doubts in
4. Gribmont & Rimez, supra note 2, at 826.
5. J. SOBERANIS, supra note 3.
6. Proyecto de Ley Sobre Inversiones Extranjeras Directos en Mexico, in EL REGIMEN
JURIDICO DE LAS INVERSIONES EXTRANJERAS EN MEXICO (R. Silva ed. 1969).
7. Id. at 18-19.
8. CONSEJO NACIONAL DE CIENCIA Y TECNOLOGIA, POLITICA NACIONAL DE CIENCIA Y
TECNOLOGIA: ESTRATEGIA, LINEAMIENTOS Y METAS 8 (1976).
9. 1 D. IBARRA, EL PERFIL DE MEXICO EN 1980 163 (1972).
10. R. Silva, supra note 6, at 143.
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the 1960s about their country's reliance on foreign technology and to crit-
icize the absence of the basic conditions for domestic research. Owners of
small and intermediate industry came to believe that technology of do-
mestic origin might protect them from foreign competition. "In the de-
bate which arose, it was observed that nearly all of the technical processes
and designs of the country's industrial plants came from other countries
at a cost which all would agree is high. It was perceived that national
scientific activity was developing painfully in an environment of extreme
economic and institutional limitations."'1
In 1970, the government responded to these problems by creating a
commission, the National Council of Science and Technology.'" The
Council's mission was to advise and assist the federal executive in estab-
lishing, executing, and evaluating national policy. Although a significant
body of opinion already maintained that Mexico's technological short-
comings were a result of the actions of transnational corporations, the
government did not initiate any regulatory measures at this time. The
focus of the council's activity was to encourage domestic research, but in
early 1972 the council announced that the plight of Mexico's weak tech-
nological infrastructure of research was aggravated by "the indiscriminate
importation of technology."' According to the council's figures, only
3,665 technicians were engaged in research in the entire nation. "It is esti-
mated that the total expenditures for inovation represent only 0.3% of
the GNP." To remedy the "displacement" of domestic scientists, the re-
port stated, the government must develop a comprehensive policy on the
transfer of technology.
The Council's statement emphasized that the activity of transna-
tional corporations and the absence of domestic support for science mutu-
ally aggravated Mexico's technological dependence. Its prescription was a
policy on international technology transfer "in coordination with policies
on industry, finance and balance of payments, closely linked to the re-
form of national education." Some readers ignored the aspects of the di-
agnosis which criticized the domestic infrastructure, electing to read the
report solely as an indictment of American domination. An editorial in
the country's preeminent newspaper declared that the Council had un-
masked that insidious "imperialism which employs technology to domi-
nate" other nations. 4 The editorial distorted the council's report, claim-
ing that the document lay no blame on Mexican culture and education.
Purporting to summarize the report, the writer stated, "It is a problem of
independence which affects the total socio-economic and moral life of the
country." The editorial concluded by decrying the ideological "mystifica-
tion of Mexican life" which falsely preaches "that national interests can
11. M. WIONCZEK, LA TRANSFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL DE TECNOLOGIA - EL CASO DE MEX-
iCo 9 (1974).
12. Diario Oficial (Dec. 29, 1970).
13. Excelsior (Jan. 10, 1972).
14. Narvaz, Excelsior (Jan. 14, 1972).
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coexist with foreign objectives on the plane of profit."
THE GROWTH OF THE DEPENDENCIA THEORY IN MEXICO
The National Council of Science and Technology provided ammuni-
tion for the proponents of dependencia theory, a social philosophy which
offered to explain the failure of third world economies to follow the
American and Western European path of development. The dependencia
theory was the principle response of the Latin American intelligencia to
Walt Rostow's theory of stages of economic growth. 5 It enjoyed wide ap-
peal throughout the region, gaining adherents in every major country and
providing a rationale for a tidal wave of protectionist legislation. The
dependencia theory held sway for nearly a decade on account of a conflu-
ence of factors. Its emergence coincided with a renaissance of nationalist
sentiment and third world solidarity financed by the rising price of oil.
This theory of development permitted national leaders to blame the
plight of their nations on external causes and to avoid adopting painful
domestic reform. Mobilizing their large majorities in the United Nations,
the third world's "Group of 77" nearly established the legal basis for sig-
nificant claims to redistribute the world's wealth in the mid-1970s.
The claims of dependencia are best stated by some of its leading pro-
ponents. The theory "tries to explain the historical genesis and evolution
of the social structures of our countries and of the special link to the
hegemonic powers."' 6 Its advocates hypothesize the existence of an asym-
metrical relationship between two nations, in which the hegemonic power
perpetuates its influence by alliances with one or more groups in the pe-
ripheral society. Through these relationships, the hegemonic power "con-
ditions" the development of the third world country, so that the interests
of transnational corporations predominate over domestic interests in
forming national policy. "What characterizes this new international econ-
omy is the control, by groups located in the dominant subsystems, of the
diffusion of new technology .... [A]ccess to these new technologies is a
necessary condition for development . ".1..'7 Transnational enterprises,
which control the flow of technology to their third world subsidiaries
"participate increasingly in the economic activities of the dependent sub-
systems." Accepting foreign capital and technology uncritically, Latin
American states have sacrificed "the autonomy of the national economic
system."' 8
15. See generally W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST
MANIFESTO (1960).
16. Krieger, La Dependencia Como Contexto Macrosocial de la Politica Cientifico -
Tecnologica, in AUTONOMIA NACIONAL o DEPENDENCIA: LA POLITICA CIENTIFICO - TECNOLOGIA,
at 117 (F. Suarez ed. 1975).
17. Furtado, Dependencia Externa y Teoria Economica, EL TRIMESTRE ECONOMICO
335-336 (1971).




Through their dominant positions in a developing country, multina-
tional corporations effectively make the nation's technology policy. The
absence of regulation is their ally. First, the home office of the transna-
tional enterprise exercises direct influence over the technology selection
of its subsidiary. 9 Second, firms in developing countries which act as sub-
contractors and suppliers of these subsidiaries must conform the specifi-
cations of their products to the demands of the contractor, employing, as
a rule, imported technology to meet these requirements. Third, local
firms which have no direct ties with the international cycle of production
generally have "a special predilection for that which is of foreign origin"
and will select this technology on grounds of sound investment or the
appeal to consumers of foreign trade names. Even the governments of
third world nations prefer imported technology to domestic research and
development when they purchase weapons systems.
CAUSALITY BETWEEN MEXICO'S PROBLEMS AND THE DEPENDENCIA THEORY
During the 1970s, newspapers and scholars produced many studies to
reveal the extent of foreign ownership of the means of production and the
role of imported technology in the Mexican economy. s For the purposes
of this essay, the accuracy of these figures is secondary in importance to
the perception of dependence upon foreign know-how which the studies
created. Even if the conclusion of dependence on foreign technology is
correct, the remedy of regulation was not self-evident. Absent from these
reports was any analysis of causation. Had foreign technology displaced
domestic research or only filled a gap created by its absence? Was the
international market the culprit, or was it Mexico's culture?
According to various studies, the entire region of Latin America
maintained a commercial balance of payments deficit in favor of "first
world" countries. In 1976, the region remitted seven billion dollars in
profits and interest which was in excess of the amount of capital invested
from abroad."s Mexico's balance of payments deficit was 350 million dol-
lars for the year. Sixty percent (60%) of Mexico's exports were destined
for the United States and eighty-nine percent (89%) of its imports were
of U.S. origin.22 Seventy percent (70%) of the country's foreign tourists
were U.S. nationals. Foreign capital also occupied a crucial position in the
domestic economy. Only two of the nine automobile manufacturers had a
majority of their shares in Mexican hands in 1974.2" Furthermore, foreign
capital was concentrated in the most technologically sophisticated areas
of the economy, affording its owners influence over the course of develop-
19. Amadeo, La Dependencia Economica y Su Relacion con la Dependencia Tecno-
logica, in Suarez supra note 16, at 138-141.
20. See, e.g., Garcia, Industrialization y Dependencia en la America Latina, EL
TRIMESTRE EcoNoMico 731 (1971).
21. Excelsior (Jan. 5, 1977).
22. Excelsior, at 15 (Feb. 1, 1977).
23. M. WIONCZEK, supra note 11, at 85.
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ment beyond the dollar value of their investments.
One study indicated that capital intensive industries purchased most
of their equipment abroad. Favorable credit terms encouraged firms in
the petrochemical industry to purchase seventy to eighty-five percent of
their machinery from foreign suppliers. The study found that "close rela-
tions were established with the suppliers after the installation of the new
equipment in a majority of the plants." '24 Only three of the nineteen firms
which were objects of the study had purchased used equipment. There
was also some evidence that the cost of imported equipment and technol-
ogy was inversely related to the extent of foreign ownership in the
purchasing firm. An examination of contracts between transnational com-
panies and their wholly-owned Mexican subsidiaries in the auto parts in-
dustry disclosed that agreements to license technology often contained no
provision for compensation at all.
An alternative explanation for the absence of any express term on
price in these technology licenses maintains that foreign corporations re-
ceive compensation for know-how in the form of repatriated dividends. In
fact, some analysts claim that transnational corporations arrange their re-
lations with third world subsidiaries with the intention of obscuring the
cost of imported machinery and technology, hiding the price for such
transfers in shareholders' dividends. In other cases the foreign firm ob-
tains its profit by raising the price of raw materials which it supplies. The
pharmaceutical industry, for example, often purchases ingredients abroad
for assembly in Mexico. One study of this industry disclosed that foreign
corporations charged their Mexican subsidiaries prices for component
parts which ranged from a hundred to a thousand percent above the in-
ternational average.
2 5
"Prestige" is often the explanation which third world corporations
provide for purchasing foreign technology, trademarks, and brand names.
Executives at four pharmaceutical companies responded to a survey by
stating that foreign licenses of technology were essential to their opera-
tions, but they would continue to use those patents and trademarks be-
cause of their recognized value in the Mexican market even if domestic
substitutes were available. This factor, in combination with the influence
of foreign ownership of the domestic means of production, the policy of
producing for export, the dynamics of the international credit market,
and many other considerations, influence the selection of technology by
Mexican manufacturers. In several cases industrialists have simply repli-
cated on Mexican soil the complete design of a factory-at the main office
of the transnational firm without first considering whether the scale of
the market or the availability of resources justified that decision. More
frequently, the transnational company modifies the design of its existing
facilities to harmonize with Mexican conditions. Of four pharmaceutical
24. Id. at 145.
25. Id. at 193.
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firms which responded to one survey, half described their plant as a com-
bination of foreign and domestic technology. The remainder stated that
they employed imported technology. One author concludes that, "[i]n
many enterprises, especially automobile industries, the plant installed in
Mexico is indistinguishable from those abroad, except in the scale of op-
eration and the use of second-hand, obsolete machinery."2
Numerous newspaper articles drew attention to the respects in which
the activity of transnational companies allegedly deformed the Mexican
economy. Writing in the periodical Excelsior, an economist from the Na-
tional Autonomous University observed that Mexico was the first place
chosen by foreign firms to send obsolete equipment. The local branch of-
fice usually has no choice but to accept the machinery. "[Tihe transna-
tionals have preferred to obtain additional profits without any productive
activity, becoming instead providers of technology."2 7 They contribute to
the bankruptcy of small and intermediate firms by engaging them as sub-
contractors, then casting them aside when the needs of the transnational
outstrip the capacity of the firm. Advertising and sale of products in the
third world, which originate in industrial nations also distort patterns of
consumption, creating a demand for soft drinks and candy bars when
there is inadequate potable water and meat.
An opinion article in the same newspaper spoke of the "profound
deformation" in the industrial sector which "premature acceleration in
the concentration and monopolization of capital" brought about.2" Be-
cause foreign investment tends to concentrate in heavy industry and large
scale manufacture, Mexico has an abundance of such enterprises but few,
well-mechanized small shops. The country's skilled labor force is un-
evenly distributed among different sectors of the economy so that tradi-
tional and primitive patterns of production exist alongside ultra-modern
techniques.
THE PRIVATE SECTOR'S RESPONSE
In the spring of 1975 representatives of private business who engaged
in international transactions, announced the formation of a committee
whose task was to present the viewpoint of their much maligned constitu-
ency. Newspaper accounts of the activities of this committee, and of the
vociferous and angry reaction of other sectors of society to its mission,
offer a revealing photograph of the ideological landscape at the moment
of high tide of the dependencia theory near the end of the Echeverria
presidency. On March 8, the president of Coparmex announced the crea-
tion of a coordinating committee of private enterprise.29 Criticizing social
theorists who oppose foreign investment, the spokesman stated that the
26. Id. at 209.
27. Excelsior (Jan. 22, 1977).
28. Excelsior (May 5, 1975).
29. Excelsior (Mar. 10, 1975).
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influence of transnational firms was not significant, amounting, he said, to
only five percent of the nation's capital, "a very small percentage, which
could not be called colonialism or serious dependency." He also urged the
legitimacy of a national organization of capitalists, similar to the officially
sanctioned unions of urban and rural labor. Excelsior's editorial writers
responded moderately to these proposals at first, observing that the bulk
of the nation's economic might was still in private hands and that the
class of capitalists had legitimate interests. Concluding that business
should be neither "satanized" nor "angelized," the editorial urged readers
to appreciate its proper role.
After a space of two months, the coordinating committee of busi-
nesses released its statement of principles, exposing its fundamental dis-
agreements with the ideological currents of the country and setting the
stage for confrontation. The businessmen asserted that "the human being
has a natural, primary and inviolable right to satisfy his needs and reach
his objectives through private property and the reasonable use of material
wealth. '30 Private enterprise is "the basic cell of the economy, a most
peculiar and valuable manifestation of the creative capacity of man and
an expression of the spiritual wealth of those who contribute to realize,
sustain and improve it .... In a democratic society economic activity is a
matter for individual activity."
The natural law basis of this platform was not remarkable in itself.
Principles of a higher law have long been the touchstone of Mexican ad-
vocates of social justice. However, in this century, references to natural
rights have justified state regulation of economic activity, not autonomy
and egoism. Natural law limits rights in property in contemporary Mex-
ico. Even the liberal reformers of the 1850s who'stripped the church and
Indian villages of their lands to transform them into articles of commerce
preferred to reason from "self-evident economic axioms" which they at-
tributed to Adam Smith than from principles of justice. Furthermore, to
urge that the proper role of the state is merely "to create the appropriate
conditions for individual achievement" is to challenge the country's deep-
est traditions of paternalism.
The platform of the business roundtable encouraged an approach to
foreign investment which was pragmatic, not hostile. Where Mexican cap-
ital is insufficient, the government should permit foreign investors to ac-
quire majority ownership in domestic concerns, particularly if the indus-
try is vital to the national welfare. This plank implicitly encouraged the
repeal of a 1973' statute on foreign investment which confined foreign
shareholders to minority ownership of firms in many industrial sectors.
Representatives of the government responded quickly to the coordi-
nating committee. Two days after the publication of the platform, a sen-
ior minister in the Echeverria administration castigated the forces of re-
action which, he said, contained "elements of resistance to change,"
30. Excelsior (May 8, 1975).
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representing "a retrogressive attitude toward the progress of the mixed
economy." 1 These businessmen fail to recognize that in Mexico the social
order "is based on the predominance of the interests of the majority over
the interests of individuals." The minister darkly accused the group of
threatening the "structure and spirit of the Mexican Constitution" and of
subverting third world solidarity.
The protagonists in this debate were neither a fringe of society nor a
splinter group of industry. The coordinating committee included among
its members the Confederation of Chambers of Commerce, the Associa-
tion of Mexican Bankers, and the Mexican Association of Insudrance Com-
panies. Their statement of principles presented a serious challenge, on
the level of ideology if not on the plane of electoral politics, to the policies
of the government. The importance of their membership also explains the
caliber of the response.
In the days following, Excelsior contained numerous editorials criti-
cizing the platform of the Coordinating Committee. A statement pub-
lished on May 12, 1975, struck at the natural right foundation of the
statement of principles. "It is obvious that the natural right of property.
• . has as its purpose the maintenance of monopoly in property." The
"vocation of private property is consumption" not accumulation, the
writer continued and "all people, without exception have the right to pos-
sess the means of feeding and clothing themselves." This editorial, like
most others of the same genre, did not bother to explore the basis of
these rights.
THE POLITICAL RESPONSE
The response rose to the level of invective a few days later when Lo-
pez Portillo, the man who would become the next President of Mexico,
informed the business community that they were "not more than one step
from Nazi-fascism."3 2 Nationalization of the means of production was an
historical process from which there could be no retreat. The leaders of
business were striving to place their own interests ahead of the
community.
Dependencia theory was diagnostic. Its proponents offered to explain
the failure of the third world to follow the pattern of economic develop-
ment of industrialized countries. Although members of this school of
thought disagreed on specifics, the fundamental explanation was the same
for each. When western Europe and the United States were building their
industrial economies in the nineteenth century, there were no nations on
earth more highly developed; but the economy of Latin America has con-
tinually been subjected to the penetration of international capitalism.
Foreign capital and technology have "conditioned" the type of industries
constructed and their scale as well as the products which they produce
31. Excelsior (May 10, 1975).
32. Excelsior (May .17, 1975).
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and consumer tastes.
On the foundation of this diagnosis, political leaders sympathetic to
the theory propounded a prescription. All relevant shades of political
thought conceded that technology and capital were necessary for contin-
ued development and that Latin America had a deficit in both. The pre-
scription was to continue admitting these resources into their countries
and establish regulatory controls. Such controls would consist of restric-
tions on the types of property and business which foreigners might own,
limits on freedom of contract between foreign and domestic firms, and
limitations of the right of transnational firms to exclude others from their
know-how and patented technology.
Efforts to implement this prescription flourished in the 1970s. Devel-
oping nations formed the Group of 77 and proposed international codes
of corporate conduct to the U.N. Commission on Trade and Develop-
ment. The General Assembly called for international redistribution of
wealth and discussed the economic rights and duties of states. Regional
arrangements such as the Andean Pact lay the foundation for national
legislation to control foreign investment. The Arab oil embargo and the
election of Salvador Allende in Chile opened new vistas of opportunity,
offering simultaneous third world control over natural resources as a ful-
crum and vigorous, independent leaders as a lever against the developed
countries. The optimism of the era, the conviction that Latin nations
were about to take control of their destinies, was manifest in the speeches
of Echeverria and others.
In his message to Congress, accompanying a bill to regulate foreign
investment, Echeverria declared, "contemporary norms of international
law repudiate any form of exploitation of weak countries."33 Foreign capi-
tal must play a "complementary role and should inevitably be
subordinate to the policies of the recipient countries." International in-
vestment is no longer "exclusively a concern of those countries in which it
originates" and it must adjust itself to the interests and purposes of the
host nation. The President's address coincided with a state visit by the
Chilean leader Salvador Allende, a confluence of events which propelled
the "representatives of imperialism" into a paroxysm of despair, at least
to one observer. A letter to the editor of Excelsior noted that these "rep-
resentatives" had denounced the Mexican initiative and Allende's recent
address to the U.N. as a "common front" against the interests of busi-
ness."' The introduction of the bill on foreign investment also coincided
with the American offensive against North Vietnam during the Christmas
of 1972. These events did not seem at all coincidental to the letter writer
who remarked, "[t]his is the form in which Mr. Nixon's bombers rever-
berate in Mexico and in the other third world countries which attempt to
get out of underdevelopment."




The Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign
Investment 5 reserved certain business activities to the government or
corporations wholly owned by nationals. These included radio and televi-
sion, urban and interurban transport, air and maritime transport, ex-
ploitation of woodlands, and distribution of natural gas. The law forbade
the granting of mining concessions to foreigners and restricted transna-
tional ownership to minority positions in any company processing petro-
chemicals or manufacturing auto parts. Any foreigner who wished to ac-
quire real estate, purchase bearer shares of stock or organize a business
was required to solicit the authorization of the National Commission of
Foreign Investment. This body authorizes participation in or control of
domestic companies by international interests, taking care that such in-
vestment complements, without displacing, local initiative.
Simultaneously, the administration of President Echeverria prepared
a bill to regulate purchases of foreign technology. The objectives of the
bill were to insure that corporations did not import technology which was
already available in Mexico, to avoid burdens on the balance of payments
and to limit extraterritorial control of domestic business. PAN and the
socialists, the principal opposition parties of the right and left, supported
the bill, but the leader of each delegation remarked in the course of floor
debates that Mexico must also stimulate its own scientific capacity.36
Speakers from both parties also peppered their remarks with lamenta-
tions on recurring strikes and unrest at the National Autonomous Univer-
sity, an oblique critique of Mexico's culture of scholarship and
innovation.
The socialist leader Ortiz Mendoza excoriated, "North American im-
perialism . . . the fundamental enemy of development in our country;"
but he also noted that protection from foreign influence is a defensive
measure.-The encouragement of indigenous know-how is the sine qua non
of development. The PAN spokesman agreed, but added that Mexico
should not "arbitrarily close the doors to foreign collaboration." He ad-
monished the newly created National Registry of Technology Transfer to
"take care" lest "regulation constrict national development."
The Undersecretary of Industry in the Echeverria administration
provided the government's response to this admonition in an essay which
he published soon thereafter. Under the title "Yes, The Rules of the
Game Are Being Changed," Jose Camillo Sainz explained that Mexico
had commenced to regulate transfers of technology "because we need an
economy placed, not at the service of material goods, but at the service of
human beings. ' . 7 Adopting the defiant tone typical of third world nation-
alism in the mid-1970s, he added, "[w]e are certain that the companies
which have been working with Mexican firms will understand [the need
35. Diario Oficial (9 Mar. 1973).
36. Excelsior (Dec. 20, 1972).
37. Comercio Exterior (Nov. 11, 1972).
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for regulation] .... But even if our action were objected to by some...
we feel we will be able to find what we want in other parts of the world."
Actually, some aspects of the law on technology transfer merely incorpo-
rated into Mexican practice well established principles of American anti-
trust law. The law prohibited tying arrangements, contractual clauses
which required Mexican firms to deal exclusively with any particular for-
eign corporation or to purchase one service or commodity as a pre-condi-
tion for purchasing another. However, the heart of the law, the provision
which removed technology licenses from the domain of private contract to
the field of public administration, was the clause requiring parties to each
agreement to obtain approval of a governmental agency under pain of
nullity of the deal.
THE MEXICAN PATENT LAWS
The National Registry of Technology Transfer38 has authority to
deny approval to any license which damages the national interest. The
statutory criteria for evaluating injury are vague. Licenses are injurious if
the technology which is the object of the contract is already available in
Mexico, if the compensation is unreasonable, or if the duration of the
agreement is excessive. By declaring international technology licenses to
be subject to the public interest, the government has diminished the se-
curity of agreements and limited the conditions under which the owner
may exclude others. Subjective criteria such as the fairness of price and
reasonableness of the duration of a license become marginally more relia-
ble if the Registry adheres to the statute and employs experts to assist its
deliberations. The foundation of the law is a notion of objectively ascer-
tainable fair value for know-how which exists independently of the pro-
cess of bargaining between the parties. This notion has a respected line-
age in Mexico. The innovative aspect of the statute is the application of
this concept to such a unique and ephemeral commodity as know-how.
Mexican and Spanish colonial law have contained many limitations
on the capacity of contracting parties to bargain on the price of commodi-
ties. Colonial cities held monopolies on the sale of grain and meat and
controlled their prices. Individuals who purchased or sold land at a price
which departed from "fair value" could cancel the contract under laws in
force until 1870. Purchasing necessities for the purpose of resale was a
crime until the late 1800s. England repealed analogous prohibitions a cen-
tury earlier. Currently, the government imposes price schedules on more
than 200 categories of consumer goods.
Assigning a fair price to any commodity administratively requires the
decision-maker to adopt some measure of value other than supply and
demand. Such a system assumes the existence of an objective measure of
worth or utility apart from the market. The Soviets have adopted one
such model, calculating inventors' compensation by determining coeffi-
38. Diario Oficial (Dec. 30, 1972).
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cients of difficulty, novelty, and extent of adoption of each new machine,
process or compound. Experience in the U.S.S.R. reveals that administra-
tors often assign such coefficients arbitrarily. Scholarly commentary is di-
vided on the issue of radical reform or abolition of the present method of
compensation. One side of this debate maintains that the purpose of any
invention is to solve an existing problem and that the best measure of its
value is the amount which the firm with the problem is willing to pay, not
the price which an administrator may compose.
In addition to imputing an objective value to be administratively de-
rived outside the market, Mexico's statute on technology transfer also di-
minishes the right of the owner to exclude others from the know-how.
Under the statute, any transfer of technology must be absolute. Unless
the know-how is protected by a patent, a foreign licensor may not require
the licensee to return technical documents, plans or secret information. In
other words, leases of technical information are invalid. Only sales of
know-how pass muster. The duration of the license may not exceed that
period of time reasonably necessary to assimilate the technology in the
opinion of the Registry. Foreign licensors are not entitled to insist that
the secrecy of the technology be maintained thereafter and may not pre-
vent the know-how from becoming available to their competitors.
The essential effect of the law is to strip foreign technology which
crosses the Mexican border of its character as a commodity by restricting
the exercise of autonomy and egoism by its owner. The master of know-
how may no longer determine to whom it will be available or at what
price. Technology ceases to be a commodity and becomes a public utility,
allocated administratively, not contractually. To the extent that the Reg-
istry renders the right to exclude and to bargain insecure, investment in
the private creation of technology may be expected to diminish.
Legal systems tend to endow values with the characteristics of prop-
erty when they become legitimate objects of exchange. When the law
transforms private commodities into public goods and strips the owner of
the right to exclude, they cease to be objects of contractual exchange. Any
society which aspires to allocate the factors of production by administra-
tive means must also fashion a method for creating value by administra-
tive means. The Soviet experience offers little encouragement for nation-
ally planned innovation.
During the course of the nineteenth century, inventive ideas became
a form of property in the United States. 9 At the beginning of that era,
Thomas Jefferson, an inventor and for a time chief administrator of the
patent system, opined that excluding other persons from one's inventions
was opposed to natural reason. At that time the statutory criteria of pat-
entability were indefinite and included a requirement of objective utility.
Judges declared patents invalid if, in their eyes, the invention tended to
39. Armstrong, From the Fetishism of Commodities to the Regulated Market: The Rise
and Decline of Property, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 79 (1988).
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promote immoral conduct. Patents were an unstable form of property be-
cause the owner could hardly predict whether he would be able to enforce
his right to exclude others.
Under the influence of the growth of market exchange, inventive
ideas became a commodity by the close of the century. The courts rein-
terpreted the statute's requirement of utility so that the right to exclude
no longer depended on such accidental considerations as the contribution
of the invention to a judge's vision of the ideal society. The principal fac-
tors in this process of reinterpretation were first, the growing importance
of market exchange throughout society, contributing to the ideology of
the alienability of values and endowing intangible attributes with the
characteristics of "things;" and second, an increasing tendency to treat
patents as commodities as demonstrated by contracts to license and as-
sign them. A general social development and profusion of market ex-
change, allied with specific development and contractual relations in in-
ventive ideas, encouraged the legislature and judges to increase the
security of this form of property. The circumstances under which the le-
gal system would recognize a right to a patent and protect it from tres-
pass became more predictable. By the beginning of the twentieth century,
rights in patents had completed a very long journey which was begun in
1521 when Parliament first permitted the crown to confer patents as a
matter of royal largesse.
Mexico adopted patent legislation but never experienced the process
of commodification of inventive ideas which occurred in the United
States. Legal, cultural and geographical restraints on trade have hindered
the infusion of the notion that values such as land, labor and articles of
consumption should be the objects of commerce. Subsequent pages will
present evidence that Mexico has not fostered an inventive culture. Crea-
tion and implementation of inventive ideas has lagged behind the econo-
mies of the western industrial nations. Consequently, the legal form of
property in inventive ideas, patent law, exists in Mexico, but is irrelevant.
The right to exclude that patent which the law confers could be, and in-
deed has been, substantially diluted without noticeably affecting anyone's
behavior.
A. The Patent Laws of the Past
The Patent Act of 19430 contained a variety of procedures through
which a private concern, with the government's assistance, might compel
the owner of a patent to grant a compulsory license to the invention. The
purpose of these provisions was to prevent foreign firms from obtaining
Mexican patents with no intent to exploit their inventions and merely for
the purpose of blocking competition. One provision simply nullified a pat-
ent if the owner did not put the invention into practice within twelve
years. If the owner did not exploit the patent within three years of the
40. Diario Oficial (Dec. 31, 1972).
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date on which it was granted or exploited it "improperly" or "inef-
ficiently," the government might order the owner to grant a compulsory
license to another firm. Such a license required the transferee to pay roy-
alties amounting to one-half of its profit from the exploitation of the
invention.
Recalling that ninety-five percent of all Mexican patents are never
"worked," the track record of petitions for compulsory licenses reveals
the extent of domestic zeal to appropriate these inventive ideas. During
the entire thirty-three year life of the Patent Act no one requested a com-
pulsory license." The Secretary of Industry and Commerce did nullify a
number of patents, but not at the request of parties who desired to use
the technology. The usual grounds for cancelation were the failure of the
patentee to pay an annual tax.
The record in the middle decades of this century revealed two salient
characteristics about innovation in Mexico. First, the overwhelming ma-
jority of patented inventions were not in use. Second, despite reasonable
access to these idle inventions through procedures for compulsory licens-
ing, competitors of patentees did not solicit the technology. If there was
some characteristic of Mexican society impeding innovation, it was not
the patent laws.
Nonetheless, the patent system did not escape the critical analysis of
the dependencia theory, whose adherents determined that laws protecting
intellectual property were the villain. Introducing legislative reform in
1975, the Undersecretary of Commerce and Industry offered a new con-
ception of the purpose of property:
Those lines of free-bourgeois ideology of the past century which con-
sider patents as a natural property right and a monopolistic privilege
which can be exercised without taking account of the public interest
are not acceptable or valid. Today, without removing the encourage-
ment to inventors, it is universally recognized that the exercise of
their rights should be limited by the interests of the collective . . ."'
The leading contemporary text on patents asserted the same proposi-
tion, though less expansively. The author recognized, in contrast to the
Undersecretary, that "natural rights" have never really been a significant
justification for patents.4 He confirmed that institutions of property law
exist to further public policy. "[T]he patent is not a natural right of the
inventor but a prerogative which the state grants so that the community
may obtain the benefit of knowledge of the invention, its appropriate
publication and its effective exploitation." If these benefits are missing,
the patent loses its justification. The author's analysis implicitly explains
a fundamental departure from the principles of the patent law of the
United States. In this country, the government grants patents in consid-
41. C. SEPULVEDA, EL SISTEMA MEXICANO DE PROPIEDAD INDUSTRIAL 84 (1981).
42. J. SOBERANIS, supra note 3, at 46-47.
43. Id. at 160.
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eration for the inventor's full disclosure of the technology. He has no obli-
gation to work the invention. In Mexico, the inventor satisfies society's
demands only if he discloses and exploits the device or process.
B. The Patent Law of 1976
The new patent legislation of 1976 implemented a number of signifi-
cant changes. Its aggregate effect was to diminish further the right of an
inventor to exclude others from his creation. The rationale was to en-
courage innovation. The new Law on Inventions and Trademarks reduced
the number of fields in which patents were available, created new provi-
sions on compulsory licenses, reduced the duration of patent grants, and
introduced Soviet style certificates of invention.
The Act declares that "the granting of a patent implies the obligation
to exploit it on national territory."4 An owner's use of the invention must
be more than symbolic. It must be an "effective industrial exploitation."
If the owner has not begun to work the patent himself or licensed it to
another firm within three years, the invention enters the public domain.
Thereafter, any person may apply to the Secretary of Commerce and In-
dustry for a compulsory license. An application must allege that the
owner is not exploiting the invention or that his use of the invention is
inadequate to satisfy the national market. The Act provides that the Di-
rector General of Patents and Trademarks may grant such a license, in
consultation with the National Registry of Technology Transfer, deter-
mining its duration, field of use, and amount of royalties.4 5 If no one ap-
plies for a compulsory license within one year of the date on which they
become available, the patent lapses and the owner loses the right to ex-
clude others from the invention entirely.
Compulsory licenses were available under prior law but no one
sought them. The explanation, said some experts, was the cumbersome
procedure and rigid requirement of compensation in the amount of half
the licensee's profit. The procedure is now clearer, the requirements for
compensation more flexible; however, there still have been no applica-
tions for compulsory licenses.
The new law also provides that the government will not issue patents
for certain types of inventions. These categories include procedures for
obtaining chemical compounds, for making alloys or for preparing
pharmaceuticals, medicines, food, beverages, fertilizer, pesticides and for
inventions with application to the field of nuclear energy. The creator of
such an invention excluded from patentability may obtain a certificate of
invention. 4" This legal device, a transplant from the U.SS.R., strips the
inventor of the right to exclude others from the device or process but
permits him to collect compensation from firms which adopt it. In the
44. Ley de Invenciones y Marcas, Diario Oficial, art. 41 (Feb. 10, 1976).
45. Id. at art. 52.
46. Id. at art. 65.
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Soviet Union, an invention protected by such a certificate is available for
use by all state-owned firms and the inventor's compensation depends
upon the savings which the device produces in practice or its utility to
society as measured by coefficients such as novelty, and difficulty."' The
Mexican patent statute contemplates that the inventor and would-be
transferees of technology protected by a certificate will initially attempt
to negotiate terms of compensation. Recognizing the futility of negotia-
tions concerning the price of a thing from which one party may not in any
case exclude the other, the law also contains procedures for arbitration by
various agencies.
An authoritative text on the rights of inventors observes that the
Mexican government adopted certificates of invention owing to the low
incidence of patent exploitation in the country. 8 Four thousand certifi-
cates were issued between 1976 and 1981. Ninety-five percent of the ap-
plicants were foreign firms. These inventors do not elect certificates of
invention in preference to patents. They obtain certificates for technology
which is not patentable subject matter and which could not be protected
by any other form of industrial property. In this respect, the 1976 Law on
Patents was unobjectionable to inventors. The treatise writer observes
that foreign firms find certificates of invention attractive because "the ex-
ploitation of the invention by other parties does not exclude the owner of
the invention from working it in competition with the one who obtains
the license."49
In fact, in Mexico a low fence excludes trespassers from technology
equally as well as a high wall. In the first five years after they became
available, no one applied to the National Registry of Technology Transfer
for permission to use a certificate of invention. 50 This experience shows
that the principal impediment to innovation is not the power to monopo-
lize inventions which the laws on intellectual property confer. Patents are
unnecessary to protect inventions from trespassers because other firms
manifest no interest in appropriating the technology. Although the law of
intellectual property has permitted inventors to exclude others, the dilu-
tion of this right by successive legislative reforms has not stimulated in-
novation. Patent law endowed inventive ideas with the form of commodi-
ties, but could not give them the essence of property: value circulating in
the market.
The prerequisites for commodification of a value are two. The first is
diffusion of market exchange in a society, creating an ideology which pro-
gressively justifies alienation of more personal and community attributes,
in other words a materialist philosophy of egoism and autonomy. The sec-
ond prerequisite is an appreciation of the commercial utility of the partic-
47. Armstrong, Legal Restraints on Innovation in the U.S.S.R., 9 REV. SOCIALIST L. 243
(1983).
48. Sepulveda, supra note 41, at 99.
49. Id. at 102.
50. Id. at 103.
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ular value by those segments of society which might employ it. Mexico
has never developed an ideology of egoism and autonomy. The principal
philosophical currents of the 1910 revolution were communitarian, a reac-
tion to privatization of land and proletarianization of rural labor. Con-
temporary limitations on freedom of contract are lineal descendants of
medieval Spanish paternalism. The first prerequisite of commodification
of values is absent. The remaining pages are devoted to the second, the
role of science.
FINAL OBSERVATIONS
Dependencia theory, which influenced public policy inordinately in
the 1970s, maintained that the dominant role of foreign capital impeded
domestic research and development. The principal consumers of ad-
vanced technology are allied or subservient to transnational corporations.
These firms exercise their power as stockholders or contractors to require
Mexican firms to purchase foreign know-how in preference to native
technology.
No observer of Mexican industry denies that the economy relies
heavily on technology of foreign origin; however, many analysts part com-
pany with dependencia theorists on the issue of causation. Some
respected scholars confess that reliance upon foreign know-how is the ef-
fect, not the cause of inadequate domestic research and development.
Those analysts who seek an explanation for the plight of science at home
generally locate the cause in either a failure of governmental policy or
their country's traditions. These are not mutually exclusive schools of
thought, and the most perceptive analysts attribute part of the blame for
the absence of domestic technology to political and cultural factors, and
assign some responsibility to foreign ownership of Mexican firms.
Two studies published in the early 1970s indicate the scope of the
problem. One report stated that in all of Mexico only 600 scientists de-
voted their time fully to research in problems associated with industrial
production."' At about the same time, Excelsior disclosed that in the
United States and USSR, one-half of one percent of the population was
engaged in scientific activity. The corresponding figure in Mexico was re-
ported to be 0.007 percent.52
Analysts who attribute the deficit of scientific research to govern-
mental policy often criticize the country's educational system. Occasion-
ally they also call for more national planning. Michael Wionzcek has writ-
ten of the need for a "profound reform of national education, whose
deficient functioning during recent decades has affected very seriously
both the capacity to adopt imported technology and the development of
indigenous technology."5 Inadequacies in the educational system not
51. Garcia, supra note 20 at 750.
52. Excelsior, Jan. 11, 1972.
53. M. WIONCZEK, COMERCIO DE TECNOLOGIA Y SUBDESARROLLO ECONOMico 270 (1973).
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only prevent the training of scientists, they impede the implementation of
any sensible policy. The bureaucrats who order equipment for laborato-
ries "haven't the slightest idea of what they are doing." '
Other writers refer to the need for "a national system for the produc-
tion of scientific and technical knowledge" without which "autonomous
innovation" is impossible."5 Such a program might include fellowships
and incentives to pursue investigation in areas of critical importance.
These writers maintain that a governmental policy which financed re-
search in food production, public health and other social sectors would
encourage indigenous research and respond to the nation's need.
On the one hand, analysts lament "the absence of a concerted politi-
cal will to support" public expenditures on science,5 yet the same writers
complain that bureaucracy is "the number one enemy of science in Mex-
ico.'"" Government funding is not easily divorced from red tape, bureau-
cracy and patronage. Those who supply the resources are unwilling to re-
linquish control. One writer says the National Council of Science and
Technology's "assignment is long-term and has only just begun.""s An-
other criticizes the agency for having "all of the characteristics of a bu-
reaucratically burdened machine. '" 59 A self-examination published by one
leading research center complained that scientific investigations in its
faculty "have unfolded without adequate coordination and with almost no
support and comprehension. 6 0 Prescribing more government funding for
science, the report hastened to add that planning "should not be centrally
imposed." Members of research institutions should be permitted "to
adopt their objectives freely."
More than one observer has argued that regulation of transnational
technology licenses and patents, the only tangible fruits of the govern-
ment's science policy, does nothing to enhance the domestic base of re-
search and development. At best, these controls only remove the control
of foreign owners from know-how which crosses the border. They do not
insure that Mexico will assimilate the new technology or that the coun-
try's scientists will use the information as a basis for further research.
Foreign technology can only stimulate domestic research if the regulatory
measures already in place "have the support of a well defined industrial
policy ... closely integrated with a national development policy."61
54. Excelsior, Interview (Jan. 17, 1972).
55. E. Leff, Dependencia Cientifico-Tecnologica y Desarrollo Economico, in MExico
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Neither controls on foreign transactions nor funding for local re-
search are effective to create a technological society unless the potential
consumers of science appreciate its utility. At present, the cultural ele-
ments which influence both the supply and the demand for technology
are weak. An editorial in the foreign trade journal, Comercio Exterior,
referred to the country's "lack of general scientific and technical culture."
Removal of the barriers to access to knowledge and funding for local re-
search "are hardly solutions in themselves," because scientific activities
are "conditioned by society.""
The writer is referring to the feebleness of the urge to innovate
among the business community of Mexico. Industrialists do not generally
seek labor saving, cost cutting or product enhancing practices through re-
search and development. A survey conducted by the Organization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development disclosed that only ten of the 137
industrialists who responded believed that absence of research and devel-
opment was an obstacle to their business.63 Another survey of the atti-
tudes of business representatives toward science reveals "the great igno-
rance which exists among Mexican industrialists not only of the
advantages which scientific and technological investigation would bring,
but also, of what these activities entail."'64
Business owners have not sought innovation because the government
has traditionally protected them from competition. The climate has not
compelled them to improve to survive. In addition, regulations determine
the retail price of commodities on the basis of their cost. The regulations
permit manufacturers a profit which is a percentage of the cost of inputs.
Paradoxically, innovation diminishes profitability in regulated industries
if it reduces costs. The growth in the share of the industrial sector which
the government owns has also stifled the necessity for innovation. Profit-
ability is a tertiary concern of the managers of quasi-state enterprises
who are untroubled by competition. National economic planning also di-
minishes the scope of local, flexible managerial decision. To the extent
that government ministries determine the mission and the factors of pro-
duction for firms, the opportunities for innovation diminish.
The respected author of a treatise on the law of inventions writes
that Mexico is plagued by "the absence of a tradition of technical and
scientific investigation. 6 5 He then refers to a second cause for the dearth
of research which appears to be distinct from the first, saying, "[w]e also
have been lacking in an industrial system of our own in which a climate
favorable to technical advances exists." These causes are not separate,
they are dialectical, as the author himself recognizes. "There does not ex-
ist then an imperative necessity for innovation here." The absence of de-
62. Cornercio Exterior, at 77 (Mar. 1977).
63. WIONCZEK, supra note 11, at 50.
64. Id.
65. Sepulveda, supra note 41, at 107.
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mand for the fruits of research has aggravated the social status and fund-
ing of the scientific community, encouraging talented people to enter
other professions or to emigrate. There is a shortage of domestic inven-
tion because there is a poverty of industrial innovation.
CONCLUSION
The solution to this crisis is not merely "to learn that we need to
know," as one editorialist writes." The social impediments to innovation
are profound. They are objective, not a result of misperception. Their
roots are buried in the colonial past. Mexico's government cannot dis-
mantle this tradition or reconstruct the temperament and beliefs of its
people. Neither can it create a market economy by a revolution from
above. The country's administered economic system is not the flower of
caprice. It has developed in response to the confluence of custom and po-
litical power. Mexico's challenge is to turn inward, to examine its own
experience and to reform the economy without prejudice to its fundamen-
tal values so that regulation and planning may nurture autonomy and
egoism.
66. Excelsior (Jan. 11, 1972).
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